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Introduction
At times, the law is far from crystalline. This is particularly evident within the law
of trusts, where it can seem that, for as many rules and principles as there are in
this area of law, there are just as many qualifications to them. Matters are made
worse when courts utter the mystifying term ‘unconscionability’ – as if a judicial
shibboleth – and treat such as sufficient to trigger the recognition of a constructive
trust.
One of the most well-known examples utilising the ‘unconscionability’
justification is that of Pennington v Waine1. Eighteen years have passed since the
decision and many were perhaps of the view that the case was consigned to the
past. However, the recent High Court case of Nosnehpetsj Ltd v Watersheds Capital
Partners2 appears to have dusted off the doctrine and breathed life into that which
was thought dead and gone. This note will consider the judgment in Nosnehpetsj
and will argue Pennington should never have been invoked, and that the
presumption made by the judge in the case risks further undermining the
formalities requirements.
1Pennington v Waine [2002] EWCA Civ 227; [2002] 1 WLR 2075.
2Nosnehpetsj Ltd v Watersheds Capital Partners Ltd [2020] EWHC 1938 (Ch).
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Facts and decision
Nosnehpetsj concerned that of a Mr Richard Buzzoni, a chartered accountant and
former corporate finance specialist, who owned two companies: Nosnehpetsj Ltd
(“JStephenson” written backwards3) and Watersheds Capital Partners Ltd (WCP).
It was understood that Mr Buzzoni held shares in both of these companies and, in
2010, transferred his ordinary shares in WCP to JStephenson Ltd; this
understanding was consistent with JStephenson Ltd’s abbreviated accounts filed at
Companies House for the year ending March 2011, which showed WCP’s ordinary
shares were owned by JStephenson Ltd from March 2010. Mr Buzzoni had
approved the accounts before they were filed.
In 2013, JStephenson Ltd transferred the WCP shares back to Mr Buzzoni
personally, and for no consideration. Then, near the beginning of 2014, following an
application made just over 12 months earlier, JStephenson Ltd was subsequently
struck off the company register and dissolved. However, later in 2014, following a
successful application from a former JStephenson Ltd employee, the company was
restored to the register for the purposes of an Employment Tribunal. In addition to
the restoration request, the former employee requested for JStephenson Ltd to be
placed into liquidation, a request which was granted in 2015. The company was
then placed into liquidation later that year and a liquidator appointed – Mr Elliot
Green.
Mr Green applied to the court to reverse the transfer of shares (which occurred
in 2013) from JStephenson Ltd to Mr Buzzoni, as JStephenson Ltd was in fact
insolvent at the time of the transfer. Despite the accounts detailing the initial
transfer from himself to JStephenson Ltd in 2010 (accounts which Mr Buzzoni had
himself approved), Mr Buzzoni claimed that he had in fact never transferred the
WCP shares to JStephenson Ltd, arguing there was never a gift of the shares to the
company and that, having not completed the necessary formalities, there was not
an effective transfer of the shares (in neither law nor equity).
The case was heard by Chief Insolvency and Companies Judge (Nicholas) Briggs
who concluded that it was more likely than not Mr Buzzoni did intend an absolute
gift of the shares to the company, having inferred such from the surrounding
evidence of the case. More importantly, Judge Briggs held that, despite there being
no completed share transfer form present (or evidence alluding to such), a
completed form had likely existed and that there was an equitable assignment of
the shares. The effect of this meant that, despite the lack of documentary evidence,
3Hereafter, ‘JStephenson Ltd’.
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the intention to transfer the shares was enough; it would have been unconscionable
for Mr Buzzoni to deny the transfer of the shares, as the information regarding
such a transfer was communicated to, and relied upon by, a third party (Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs).
Comment
When an owner of property, acting of their own volition, seeks to transfer their
property they may be required to adhere to specific formalities. For instance,
though an owner may orally declare a trust of their land, statute requires for the
declaration to be manifested and proved by signed writing.4 Similarly, if the owner
of shares seeks to transfer such as a gift, there are specific legal formalities for
doing so.5 But of course, these statutory requirements are not, technically
speaking, a sine qua non; there are occasions where, despite the legal formalities
having not been satisfied, the eyes of equity will look upon it as effective. As Arden
LJ memorably stated, “equity [has] tempered the wind to the shorn lamb…[and
done so] on more than one occasion and in more than one way.”6 Pennington v
Waine was one such instance.
As well-known as Pennington v Waine is, however, there is not a clear consensus
regarding the principle’s roots. Some are of the opinion that it was merely an
extension – the equitable overgrowth – of the rule in Re Rose.7 Others have taken
secateurs to sever and (trans)plant Pennington in a wholly separate pot, treating it
as a distinct doctrine.8 Whatever the reader’s view of the decision, the passage of
time coupled with the judicial disinclination to invoke the principle9 implied that
Pennington was to be left alone, to wither away.
4s53(1)(b) Law of Property Act 1925.
5s1 Stock Transfer Act 1963.
6Pennington v Waine [2002] EWCA Civ 227; [2002] 1 WLR 2075 at [54] per Arden LJ. Echoing
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in T Choithram International SA v Pagarani [2001] 1 WLR 1 at [11]: equity
will not “strive officiously to defeat a gift”.
7Re Rose, Rose v IRC [1952] Ch 499; [1952] 1 All ER 1217 (CA). See e.g. G Virgo, The Principles
of Equity Trusts, 4th edn, (Oxford University Press 2020) p 142; JE Penner, The Law of Trusts,
11th edn (Oxford University Press 2019) p 217.
8eg. S Sutherland, ‘Defying easy explanations – the case of Pennington v Waine 18 years on’
(2020) 26(5) Trusts Trustees 404, 405; C Webb and T Akkouh, Trusts Law, 5th edn (Palgrave,
2017) p 135; M Halliwell, ‘Perfecting imperfect gifts and trusts: have we reached the end of the
Chancellor’s foot?’ (2003) Conv 192, 195.
9See eg. Zeital v Kaye [2010] EWCA Civ 159; Curtis v Pulbrook [2011] EWHC 167 (Ch); [2011]
1 BCLC 638.
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In 2019, three separate High Court cases revisited Pennington. Each of the three
cases made reference to Pennington10 – yet they were far from ringing
endorsements of the doctrine. Indeed, within UTB LLC v Sheffield United Ltd11,
Pennington was only mentioned briefly in passing; the judge having given short
shrift to the claimant’s argument of its relevance to the case.12 Likewise, in both
Collins v Simonsen13 and JSC VTB Bank v Skurikhin14, although Pennington was
discussed in more depth, both judges dismissed the application of such, again
distinguishing on the facts. It is therefore clear that, notwithstanding the allusions
made within each of these recent decisions, they cannot be interpreted as the courts
tilling the equitable soil in preparation for a Pennington revival. If anything, the
cases only serve to echo the prevailing conversative mood of the courts towards the
Pennington principle; the judiciary likely only to give credence to such (if at all)
provided it is, as Clarke LJ would say, “on all fours with the instant case”.15 As will
be discussed, Nosnehpetsj is not a case which can be said to be on all fours with it,
making Judge Briggs’ decision all the more surprising. Yet, before analysing that
judgment, it is first necessary to briefly revisit Pennington v Waine.
Pennington v Waine
Pennington v Waine concerned a Mrs Ada Crampton who had sought to transfer
400 of her shares in Crampton Bros Ltd absolutely to her nephew, Harold
Crampton Jr. However, Mrs Crampton failed to effectuate an inter vivos transfer
in accordance with the legal formalities; the completed transfer form was
inadvertently retained (through the fault of the company auditor Mr Pennington),
and thus never received by the company before her death. Therefore, the company
could not register her nephew as the new legal owner of the 400 shares.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed to treat that which may
have otherwise been considered an imperfect gift of shares, as effective in equity.
Within his judgment, Clarke LJ chose to focus on the issue of whether there was
an effective equitable assignment of the shares. Mrs Crampton had demonstrated a
clear intention to transfer the shares outright to her nephew and had also
10Each one heard within different divisions of the High Court: JSC VTB Bank v Skurikhin [2019]
EWHC 1407 (Comm); Collins v Simonsen [2019] EWHC 2214 (QB); UTB LLC v Sheffield United
Ltd [2019] EWHC 2322 (Ch). UTB LLC v Sheffield United Ltd [2019] EWHC 2322 (Ch).
11UTB LLC v Sheffield United Ltd [2019] EWHC 2322 (Ch).
12Ibid, at [252] per Fancourt J.
13Collins v Simonsen [2019] EWHC 2214 (QB).
14JSC VTB Bank v Skurikhin [2019] EWHC 1407 (Comm).
15Pennington v Waine [2002] EWCA Civ 227; [2002] 1 WLR 2075 at [86] per Clarke LJ.
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completed the necessary share transfer form (as required by statute); in his
Lordship’s view, the existence of a completed transfer form alone was that which
was required for an equitable assignment of shares.16
Likewise, implicit within Arden LJ’s judgment (with whom Schiemann LJ
agreed) was that the presence of a completed share transfer form was necessary for
there to be an equitable assignment of shares.17 Though admittedly the existence
of the completed transfer form was not the sole determining factor influencing the
outcome, it was still a significant one. Within her judgment, Arden LJ explained
that central to the decision was unconscionability – to prevent resiling from the gift
– but added that there can be “no comprehensive list of factors which makes it
unconscionable for the donor to change his or her mind: it must depend on the
court’s evaluation of all the relevant considerations.”18 Her Ladyship then went on
to state that which she deemed the key relevant factors in the case, including that
of the presence of the completed share transfer form.19 In other words, presence of
that form (necessary for an equitable assignment) played an important role in the
Court’s decision; it is highly unlikely the Court would have ruled as it did absent a
completed share transfer form.20
Nosnehpetsj: Pennington revived?
Evidently, Nosnehpetsj was not a case which stood on all fours with Pennington; it
was, at best, bipedal. Though it involved a transfer of shares, and by way of gift, it
was not in a familial setting nor did it concern giving effect to the deceased
transferor’s wishes; it concerned an insolvency, with the transferor still alive, and
those who were to ultimately benefit from the invocation of Pennington not being
the intended donee/recipient, but rather third-party creditors on whose behalf the
liquidator was acting. Such differences aside, more important was how Pennington
was considered.
Within the judgment, Judge Briggs listed the factors which he considered to have
supported unconscionability in Pennington. Rather surprisingly though, he did not
to refer to the Court of Appeal decision but the remarks of the puisne judge in the
High Court decision instead. Consequently, his Justice iterated three factors which
16Delivery of such was not needed (Ibid, at [81-83] and [87] per Clarke LJ).
17Ibid, at [66] per Arden LJ.
18Ibid, at [64] per Arden LJ.
19Ibid.
20The same for which could be said of Re Rose, Rose v IRC [1952] Ch 499; [1952] 1 All ER 1217
(CA).
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he considered supported unconscionability in Pennington, viz. that there was an
intention to make an immediate gift; the donee had been informed of the gift; and
that it would have been unconscionable to recall the gift.21 Careful consideration of
these factors, however, reveals their problems. The first and second elements, taken
together, are equivalent to impromptu benevolent comments potentially being
enforced – and far from being a saving grace, the third element is a petitio
principii; it begs the question.
A close examination of the judgment also reveals that Judge Briggs neglected to
mention the subsequent, specific factors which her Ladyship deemed significant in
Pennington – the very factors which influenced the Court of Appeal in their finding
that it would have been unconscionable to resile. One such factor being the
presence of the completed share transfer form.22 Though it is perhaps unfair to say
that, this particular omission, shows his Justice’s reluctance to attribute sufficient
weight/significance to the need for a completed share transfer form to be present,
the omission should not be ignored. This is because, in not discussing the
importance of such a form having to being present, it meant his decision to presume
there was a completed form (on the balance of probabilities23) was but a small step
to take. Yet, even this seemingly small step can have unforeseen consequences.
Rule in Re Rose
Judge Briggs said it was likely that Mr Buzzoni and Mr Stephenson had produced
a stock transfer form, that it would have been completed by the defendant, Mr
Buzzoni, and the form subsequently countersigned by the company.24 The judge
then stated:
“…it is more likely than not the stock transfer [form], although not
registered, was left on the Company file and was one of the documents
shredded. Alternatively, it was uploaded electronically and held on the
Company server which either no longer exists or has not been
disclosed”.25
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That is, any discussion of Pennington v Waine should be considered superfluous as
such a presumption places Nosnehpetsj on a similar footing to Re Rose26; the donor
being deemed to have executed and delivered the share transfer form to the donee
company, but the transfer of shares not being registered by the company. This
seemingly slight step taken by his Justice – finding that there was likely a
completed transfer form and it was received by the company – consequently meant
the rule in Re Rose should have been the applicable rule, not that of Pennington;
the transferor had done all within his power to give effect to the transfer of the
shares.27
Nevertheless, as alluring as the Re Rose point is, we should be careful not to
ignore the fact the judge’s presumption is doing a fair amount of work here.
Though it may seem somewhat innocuous, his presuming there existed a share
transfer form (which was completed and then received by the company), meant
that the only other issue was to establish an intention to transfer the shares – an
intention which he was able to infer without too much difficulty from the
surrounding evidence.28 This meant Judge Briggs was able to overlook the need for
actual evidence of a completed share transfer form (despite such being important in
both Pennington and Re Rose) and to take a fairly broad sword to the problem. As
a result, Nosnehpetsj does little for supporting the formalities requirements –
something which Arden LJ explicitly warned about29 – and nor does it do much to
provide clarity in an already disordered area of the law. It now seems possible for
there to be an equitable assignment of shares despite there being no evidence of a
completed share transfer form. Looked at critically, Nosnehpetsj appears to be
close to a decision where the court had strived officiously to uphold a gift.
26Re Rose, Rose v IRC [1952] Ch 499; [1952] 1 All ER 1217 (CA).
27That the transferor subsequently contests the transfer will not necessarily preclude the rule
from applying (see eg. Mascall v Mascall (1984) 50 P CR 119).
28Nosnehpetsj Ltd v Watersheds Capital Partners Ltd [2020] EWHC 1938 (Ch) at [90]. Thus,
removing the need to consider a possible presumed resulting trust.
29“Nothing in this judgment is intended to detract from the requirement that a donor should
comply with any formalities required by the law to be complied with by him or her, such as, in the
case of a gift of shares, the completion of an instrument of transfer” (Pennington v Waine [2002]
EWCA Civ 227; [2002] 1 WLR 2075 at [69] per Arden LJ).
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Fraud
There is a simpler solution, one which does not require presuming the existence of a
completed share transfer form. CICC Judge Briggs explained that:
“A running theme through the liquidation and this litigation is Mr
Buzzoni’s failure to produce books and records of [JStephenson Ltd] of
the type and scale expected by Mr Green. Mr Buzzoni’s account of the
whereabouts and existence of records has altered over time.”30
Speaking in relation to email evidence from October 2012 concerning a
request from Mr Buzzoni to Mr Stephenson, his Justice did not mince
his words: “[Mr Buzzoni] was asking Mr Stephenson to manipulate the
accounts.”31
Additionally, he declared that “it [was] more likely than not that Mr Buzzoni was
attempting to ‘tidy up’ past dealings”32 and claimed that Mr Buzzoni “either
caused or allowed the transfer form to be shredded or lost”.33 The clear insinuation
being that he did not consider Mr Buzzoni a trustworthy man, but a dishonest one.
Judge Briggs’ depiction of Mr Buzzoni leads to the possibility of an alternative,
and more straightforward, line of reasoning which could have been pursued. Mr
Buzzoni contested that there was never any assignment of the shares consequent of
there being no completed transfer form in existence. Of course, the purpose of this
counterargument by the defendant was likely to prevent the liquidator depriving
him of the shares (Mr Green seeking to obtain them on behalf of the company’s
creditors). But, looked at from another angle, this was simply Mr Buzzoni seeking
to use statute as an instrument for fraud. By relying on (his apparent lack of
adherence to) the formalities of the Stock Transfer Act 1963, so as to deny an
effective transfer of the shares and thus retain ownership, he had committed
fraud.34 Consequently, he would be holding the shares on constructive trust for the
liquidator, and ultimately the creditors; it would have been unconscionable for Mr
Buzzoni to rely on the statutory formalities in an effort to defraud the company’s
creditors and personally benefit from retention of the shares.




34The intention to transfer the shares again being inferred from the surrounding evidence.
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Conclusion
Many years have passed since the judgment in Pennington was handed down.
While it would be wrong to say that recent decisions were calling for abolition of
the doctrine, they nevertheless reflected the contemporary courts’ reluctance to
invoke it.35 Nosnehpetsj is, therefore, a decision which appears to be at odds with
the general tenor of the judiciary. Crucially, however, it was a case which did not in
fact require invocation of the doctrine. Moreover, the same outcome could have
been achieved through more straightforward means – the prevention of fraud – with
such an approach more deferential to statute and not risking the possibility of
undermining the formalities requirements. Therefore, though the overall outcome
can be viewed as an incidence of well-meaning husbandry by the High Court, and is
surely correct, it would be remiss to consider it another instance wherein equity
tempered the wind. And it would be wise to acknowledge the key role the
presumption played in the case – and to be cautious should courts do likewise in
future. For it would only take one further (mis)step for it to be tantamount to
providing the lamb with a shelter, but one built solely from the branches of the
infamous palm tree.
35Zeital v Kaye [2010] EWCA Civ 159; Curtis v Pulbrook [2011] EWHC 167 (Ch); [2011] 1 BCLC
638; Winkler v Shamoon [2016] EWHC 217 (Ch); JSC VTB Bank v Skurikhin [2019] EWHC 1407
(Comm); Collins v Simonsen [2019] EWHC 2214 (QB); UTB LLC v Sheffield United Ltd [2019]
EWHC 2322 (Ch).
